JANE BURGERMEISTER REPORT: ‘German coalition government rebels against Merkel-Sarkozy Greek debt plan and its leniency on banks’
German coalition government rebels against Merkel-Sarkozy Greek debt plan and its leniency on banks
German Coalition Critiques Merkel-Sarkozy Greece Plan -Report
FRANKFURT (Dow Jones)–German coalition government leaders have criticized plans for a voluntary Greek debt rollover agreed to by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, arguing that the plan falls short of a full-scale debt restructuring favored by Berlin, German news magazine Der Spiegel reported Saturday.
“This isn’t the private sector participation that the German Bundestag pushed for,” said Frank Schaeffler, a member of the FDP Free Democratic Party.
Read more at: http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20110618-702530.html
JANE BURGERMEISTER REPORT: ‘Euro Area May Break Up by 2013 on Bailout Strains, CEBR Says’
Euro Area May Break Up by 2013 on Bailout Strains, CEBR Says
Sunday, June 19, 2011
June 20 (Bloomberg) — The euro area is on course to break up as member nations’ willingness to continue bailouts for the region’s indebted countries dissipates, the Centre for Economics and Business research said in a research note.
JANE BURGERMEISTER REPORT: ‘Boris Johnson: Let Greece default on its debts and leave the euro’
Boris Johnson: Let Greece default on its debts and leave the euro
Single currency is responsible for ‘exacerbating’ the international financial crisis, says London Mayor
In Spain thousands have flooded the streets blaming bankers and politicians for painful spending cuts
Last updated at 3:21 PM on 20th June 2011
Boris Johnson said Britain should refuse to contribute to another bailout of Greece
Greece should be allowed to default on its debts and leave the euro, according to London Mayor Boris Johnson.
JANE BURGERMEISTER REPORT: ‘Britain ‘won’t bail out Greece again’ says Downing Street’
Britain ‘won’t bail out Greece again’ says Downing Street
George Osborne, the chancellor, will tell EU finance ministers in Luxembourg today that Britain does not intend playing a part in any new aid package for Greece.
By Szu Ping Chan and Andy Bloxham
12:16PM BST 20 Jun 2011
European financial markets tumbled on Monday morning as the postponement of a final decision on extending £10.6billion (€12bn) in emergency loans to Greece spooked investors across the world.
Read more at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/8586519/Financial-markets-slide-over-Greek-bailout-delays.html
JANE BURGERMEISTER REPORT:’SENSIBLE GERMAN DEFENCE MINISTER KEEPS ARMY OUT OF LIBYA AND SYRIA ‘
SENSIBLE GERMAN DEFENCE MINISTER KEEPS ARMY OUT OF LIBYA AND SYRIA
06/20/2011
SPIEGEL Interview with Defense Minister De Maizière
‘We Will Not Get Involved’ in Syria
Christian Thiel / DER SPIEGEL
German Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière in Berlin: “Significant progress must be made in Afghanistan.”
The US has been critical of Germany for not supporting NATO in the mission in Libya. SPIEGEL spoke to German Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière about Berlin’s skepticism of getting involved in Libya and Syria, and about the future of the NATO alliance.
SPIEGEL: Minister de Maizière, during his recent speech on the future of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, outgoing US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that there are two categories of NATO partners: those who fight and those who dig wells. Which category is Germany in?
Thomas De Maizière: In Afghanistan, we’re demonstrating that the Bundeswehr (eds. note: the German military) is a fighting army whenever it has to be.
SPIEGEL: When it comes to NATO’s mission in Libya, Gates recently said that Germany, among others, wasn’t doing enough. What is your response?
De Maizière: Our decision to not participate in the military part of the Libya mission was based on carefully considered reasons. It remains correct. But that doesn’t put us in the category of mere well-diggers, as you put it.
SPIEGEL: Have you no bad conscience at all, given that your NATO partners in Libya are running out of steam and munitions?
De Maizière: The Americans did ask us for military assistance again at the most recent NATO meeting. We turned them down. But we have made things easier for the alliance by allowing German AWACS planes to participate in the mission in Afghanistan. And there’s one thing I’d like to add: When you start something, you of course always have to know how long you can keep it up.
SPIEGEL: On the eve of the first NATO airstrikes, you said on German public broadcaster ZDF: “Could the fact that we are suddenly intervening now have something to do with oil? We can’t get rid of all the dictators in the world with an international military mission.” Would you still say the same thing?
De Maizière: Yes. The “responsibility to protect” a country’s civilian population if its government violates human rights is firmly anchored in international law. But does that mean we are allowed to intervene? Or does that mean we’re actually required to? I believe that each military operation must be analyzed to determine whether its goals can be achieved with appropriate means and within an appropriate time frame as well as how one gets out at the end. Every one.
SPIEGEL: You are dodging the question. You have insinuated that Germany’s NATO allies are only intervening in Libya because of oil.
De Maizière: No, I wasn’t insinuating that at all. I strictly formulated that as a hypothetical.
SPIEGEL: But your formulation still implies it.
De Maizière: During the interview, I was pointing out that there have to be criteria for each and every decision about humanitarian intervention — even if that presents me with a number of dilemmas. If I say yes once, then I’ll have to justify why I say no the next time. Refraining from action is also a decision. One must make a decision, but one can’t expect that — no matter what the decision is — that one can always emerge from this kind of matter with clean hands. I have to live with that.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,769339,00.html
Does John Key stand to personally profit from open-cast coal mining in NZ?
www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/5171922/Pike-River-mine-would-be-illegal-in-Australia-Key
Pike River mine ‘would be illegal in Australia’ – Key
KATE CHAPMAN LATEST:
Prime Minister John Key has defended his claims that the Pike River coal mine would be illegal in Australia.
The comment has sparked a backlash from Labour leader Phil Goff who has described it as ”an unbelievable about-face”.
The Australian newspaper reported that Key had yesterday “vowed that there would be changes to mining safety laws”.
He told the newspaper the Pike River mine, which was a single-entry uphill mine, “couldn’t have been constructed in Australia” because it would have been “illegal”.
“There will be changes in New Zealand,” Key said.
This afternoon, Key said there was a difference between construction and safety standards.
The way the mine was consented in New Zealand was probably legal here but that was for the Royal Commission of Inquiry to decide.
“It’s quite true that from a construction perspective that mine would not be consented in Australia and was consented in New Zealand. From a safety standard perspective that’s a matter for the Royal Commission to tell us.”
Key said to the best of his knowledge mines here were as safe as those in Australia.
The EPMU has said the law should be changed now if New Zealand mines were not as safe as they could be. Key said there were no current applications for consent for mines.
“We did do a review of mines in the end the Royal Commission will come back.”
In his interview with the Australian, Key repeated comments to New Zealand media that a full response on mining safety would have to wait until the conclusion of the Royal Commission into the Pike River mine disaster, which killed 29 men in November last year.
But, in an apparent departure from his comments at the time of the disaster, Key conceded that the mine could not have been operational in Australia.
In November last year, however, he said:
“I have no reason to believe that New Zealand safety standards are any less than Australia’s.”
Key has this afternoon landed in Wellington after a short trip to Canberra and Sydney. He will face questions over the comments when Parliament sits this afternoon.
Already, Goff has said the “sudden change in his position” is “quite incredible”. “Just a month ago he publicly condemned a union representative for questioning safety at the mine, accusing her of being ‘churlish and insensitive’,”
Goff said. “He also said it was ‘dangerous’ to raise concerns about safety issues when the Royal Commission of Inquiry was still under way.
Yet he is now making similar claims himself while the Commission is still under way.
” If there was any new evidence about serious safety issues in New Zealand’s mines, there should be immediate action to address those concerns, Goff said.
The Royal Commission is currently receiving written submissions and open hearings will recommence in July. ____________________________________________________________
Seen the Sunday Programme on Pike River Mine?
tvnz.co.nz/sunday-news/disturbing-questions-pike-river-mine-part-1-15-04-video-4222074
tvnz.co.nz/sunday-news/disturbing-questions-pike-river-mine-part-2-8-34-video-4222107
Hmmmm…….. seems the Pike River Mine ‘whistleblower’ was correct about safety concerns
– what else …………….?
www.scribd.com/doc/47745564/Murder-at-Pike-River-Mine-SECOND-EDITION-With-Postscript
Check out Chapter 9, pg 38,
“SECRET PLAN TO OPEN UP PARKS TO OPEN CAST MINING: BATHURST RESOURCES & L&M COAL”
Check out Bathurst Resources Ltd, the company which is currently applying for a resource consent for open-cast coal mining in Buller:
See ‘Resource Consent Process’ 7 June 2011
“Buller Coal Resource Consent Application Public Hearing Commences”
www.bathurstresources.com/Investor-Information/Announcements/2011-ASX-Announcements
Who is a substantial shareholder in Bathurst Resources Ltd?
See April 29 2011 ‘Changes in substantial ownership’
The Bank of America has voting power of 7.50% in Bathurst Resources Ltd.
Remember? John Key is a shareholder in the Bank of America.
So – would John Key stand to personally profit from open cast coal-mining in the West Coast, given his shareholding in the Bank of America?
Penny Bright
NZ JUDICIAL CORRUPTION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS? What EXACTLY did Vince Siemer say about Michael Stiassny that was ‘anti-semitic’ or constituted ‘vile racist abuse’? SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT 3 June 2011 (SC 49/2011) [2011] NZSC 63
20 June 2011
NZ JUDICIAL CORRUPTION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS?
What EXACTLY did Vince Siemer say about Michael Stiassny that was ‘anti-semitic’ or constituted ‘vile racist abuse’?
SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT 3 June 2011 (SC 49/2011) [2011] NZSC 63
On 23 December 2008, Cooper J delivered his judgment awarding the first respondent, Michael Peter Stiassny, defamation damages against Vincent Ross Siemer, totalling $825,000 and the second respondent, Korda Mentha, damages of $95,000 ($75,000 for defamation and $20,000 for breach of an agreement settling a dispute between the parties).
This was the highest ever defamation award in New Zealand.
(Korda Mentha v Siemer HC Auckland CIV-2005-404-1808, 23 December 2008. )
“An unusual feature of the case is that Mr Siemer had been debarred from defending the proceedings.”
Whatever happened to ‘Justice 101’?
That there are always at least TWO sides to the story, and in order to get a ‘fair trial’ you are supposed to be able to defend yourself?
Vince Siemer appealed to the Court of Appeal against J Cooper’s decision, and lost.
(Siemer v Stiassny [2011] NZCA 106. )
He then sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, but his application was dismissed.
((SC 49/2011) [2011] NZSC 63 3 June 2011 )
The judgment of Cooper J accused Vince Siemer of engaging in “vile racist abuse”;
Subsequently, a comment was made by the Court of Appeal that its attention had not been drawn to a worse case of defamation in the British Commonwealth and that its own researches had not disclosed one.
(Following comments from Steven Price Media Law Journal on these matters)
http://www.medialawjournal.co.nz/?p=205
www.medialawjournal.co.nz/?p=452
That’s pretty heavy stuff!
Vince Siemer was denied his day in Court to defend himself at the defamation hearing at which he got the highest ever defamation award against him and he has been denied leave to appeal to the Supreme Court about the accuracy of the comments upon which the defamation award was based.
So what EXACT ‘defamatory’ statements made by Vince Siemer about Michael Stiassny were relied upon by Judge Cooper from the High Court; Judges Arnold, Glazebrook and Hammond from the Court of Appeal; and Judges Blanchard, Tipping and William Young from the Supreme Court as being:
a) ‘anti-semetic’?
b) constituting ‘vile racist abuse’?
c) constituting ‘poking racist jibes’?
I, for one, have studied the following
SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT 3 June 2011 (SC 49/2011) [2011] NZSC 63
and have found nothing that Vince Siemer has stated about Michael Stiassny , which, in my considered opinion is ‘anti-semetic’, or constitutes ‘vile racist abuse’ or ‘poking racist jibes’.
WHAT DO YOU THINK?
YOU BE THE JUDGE!
_______________________________________________________________
www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/from/decisions/judgments
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND SC 49/2011 [2011] NZSC 63 BETWEEN VINCENT ROSS SIEMER
Applicant
AND MICHAEL PETER STIASSNY
First Respondent
AND KORDA MENTHA FORMERLY FERRIER HODGSON
Second Respondent
Court: Blanchard, Tipping and William Young JJ
Counsel: Applicant in person
J G Miles QC and P J L Hunt for Respondents
Judgment: 3 June 2011 ________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT OF THE COURT ________________________________________________________________
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
REASONS
[1] Vincent Ross Siemer seeks leave to appeal against a judgment of the Court of Appeal of 30 March 2011 (1) dismissing his challenge to a judgment of Cooper J delivered on 23 December 2008 awarding the first respondent, Michael Peter Stiassny, defamation damages totalling $825,000 and the second respondent, Korda Mentha, damages of $95,000 ($75,000 for defamation and $20,000 for breach of an agreement settling a dispute between the parties).(2)
______________________________________________________________
(1) Siemer v Stiassny [2011] NZCA 106.
(2) Korda Mentha v Siemer HC Auckland CIV-2005-404-1808, 23 December 2008.
_____________________________________________________________
[2] An unusual feature of the case is that Mr Siemer had been debarred from defending the proceedings.(3) For this and other reasons, his appeal gave rise to a number of procedural difficulties. These were addressed in a judgment of the Court of Appeal of 22 December 2009,(4) the effect of which was to strike out the appeal in all respects save as to the quantum of damages.(5) A subsequent application for leave to appeal against that decision was dismissed by this Court.(6)
[3] Most of the bases upon which the applicant seeks leave to appeal involve attempts by him to revisit arguments which have been conclusively rejected by earlier judgments and which we therefore need not discuss. These include complaints about Hammond J which have been earlier addressed and rejected by this Court.
This leaves in contention three possible issues which we will briefly discuss:
(a) Mr Siemer‟s complaint that the judgment of Cooper J wrongly accused him of engaging in “vile racist abuse”;
(b) a comment made by the Court of Appeal that its attention had not been drawn to a worse case of defamation in the British Commonwealth and that its own researches had not disclosed one; and
(c) complaints about the way Mr Siemer was treated in the course of a hearing before the Court of Appeal.
[4] In the part of his judgment where he was reviewing the case for Mr Stiassny, Cooper J observed:
[48] [Mr Stiassny] complained also that some of the language used by Mr Siemer had apparently been calculated to be offensive to him and caused distress. Examples that he gave included ridicule of his name. Mr Siemer had distributed stickers saying “There is an “ass‟ in our website “www.stiassny.org”. Also there had been references to his Jewish religion and to the persecution of the Jews. Thus, in his letter to the New Zealand
______________________________________________________________
(3) Ferrier Hodgson v Siemer HC Auckland CIV-2005-404-1808, 9 July 2007. The procedural history is outlined in the judgment under appeal at [10]–[18].
(4) Siemer v Stiassny [2009] NZCA 624.
(5) See [69].
(6) Siemer v Stiassny[2010] NZSC 57.
________________________________________________________________
Institute of Chartered Accountants of 14 February 2005
Mr Siemer had written:
News Flash! Michael Stiassny tells Professional Conduct Committee that sky is yellow … again, the sky is yellow.
[49] Further, on http://www.stiassny.org, on the “interviews page” Mr Siemer had referred to him as a man with “exceptional sway within the small Jewish community” and had commented that “when the judiciary determines that a ruthless and powerful man’s reputation is so priceless … the Gestapo cannot be far behind … people like Adolph[sic] Hitler …”.
[50] On a page headed “the Smartest Guy in the Room”, Mr Siemer had stated: Stiassny will likely have taken his family and ill-gotten gains to exile in Israel or Switzerland.
[51] On the welcome page, Mr Siemer had referred to Mr Stiassny in the phrase: … what a good Jew he is (no joke).
(Emphasis added)
Toward the end of his judgment, Cooper J, in what must have been a reference back the paragraphs just set out, said that “the defamatory comments have been accompanied in some cases by clear instances of vile racist abuse”.(7)
[5] As we understand Mr Siemer‟s position, the words referred to by Cooper J at [49] which we have italicised appeared in a different “article” (if that is the right word)(8) from the reference to Mr Stiassny‟s “exceptional sway within the small Jewish community”.
He claims that his references to Mr Stiassny being Jewish are innocuous and that there was thus no basis for the Judge to find that he had engaged in “vile racist abuse”.
[6] Mr Siemer‟s argument was dealt with by the Court of Appeal in this way:
[69] A second matter is that Mr Siemer takes strong exception to the way in which he was characterised by the Judge as having made “vile racial attacks” on Mr Siemer.
In his brief written submissions he said, “It is evidence Cooper J fabricated vile racist evidence because the anti-Semitic quote he created is a combination of words he took from different articles and juxtaposed into an unrepresentative quote”. Before us, he enlarged on
_____________________________________________________________
(7) At [78].
(8) From the material Mr Siemer has submitted the words were contained in what purported to be an interview with Mr Siemer.
_____________________________________________________________
this:he suggested that the Judge had taken “Hitler”, “Gestapo” and “Jew” out of discrete publications and rolled them all up, out of context, into a “quote” that he attributed to the appellant. In fairness to the Judge, the “quote” had been put in that manner by the plaintiffs in their submissions.
[70] We accept that the words Cooper J set out were taken from different articles and that intervening passages were omitted. However, we understand that the articles in question ran continuously on, one from another article on the website. It must also be said that Mr Siemer was, at the very least, sailing very close indeed to the wind. It was hardly unreasonable for the Judge to reach the view that, however expressed, Mr Siemer was poking racial gibes at Mr Stiassny. And, as the trier of fact, that inference was a matter for the Judge. Certainly it was a matter that he was entitled to take into account, although the precise weight to be given to it has to be seen – as indeed the Judge did – in the larger context. Mr Siemer‟s problem was that he had “personalised” the attacks he was making in the basest kind of way, quite deliberately, and on an ongoing basis. That was what the Judge appears to have been concerned about.
[7] It is not clear to us what Cooper J intended to convey in [49] by his references to “the Gestapo” and “people like Adolph[sic] Hitler”. In the context of the “interview” provided to us by Mr Siemer, these expressions were used by way of criticism of the courts‟ willingness to grant injunctive relief to protect the reputation of someone who was “powerful, ruthlessly aggressive and dodgy in his public dealings”, as Mr Siemer characterised Mr Stiassny. They thus do not have any apparent anti-Semitic connotation. This point was recognised by the Court of Appeal. The Court was nonetheless of the view that it was open to the Judge to conclude on the basis of the material as a whole that Mr Siemer was “poking racial gibes” at Mr Stiassny. In light of this, and in the more general context of the way the Court described Mr Siemer‟s behaviour in the last two sentences of [70], we do not see anything of substantial moment in this proposed appeal point.
[8] On the second question, it is clear that the egregiousness of Mr Siemer‟s conduct lay not so much in the detail of his allegations against Mr Stiassny which, while serious enough, must have been surpassed, in terms of sting, in other cases. Rather, it lay in the unusually broad scope and harassing nature of Mr Siemer‟s campaign against Mr Stiassny and his persistence in defiance of court orders. We have not ourselves surveyed Commonwealth jurisprudence in search of a case which is worse in the respects just mentioned, but interestingly, if there is a worse case, it has not been identified by Mr Siemer. In light of this, we do not see this complaint as warranting leave to appeal.
[9] On the third issue, it is necessary to refer to the material which has been placed before us in a little more detail.
[10] Mr Siemer‟s factual contentions are set out in various documents, but for present purposes, it is sufficient to take them from a letter of 8 November 2010 to the Judicial Conduct Commissioner as to what happened at the hearing of his appeal:
The first concern arose when the three Justices … attempted to prevent submissions in respect to Cooper J fabricating evidence in the form of racist invective where it did not exist. This was overcome by reading to them Para. [11] of the Supreme Court decision,(9) but the Judges were not happy.
The [B]ench then unfairly attempted to devalue the egregious nature of what Cooper J had done. The official audio-record will show the three [J]udges made comments evidently designed to coerce me to unfairly confirm my submissions were that Cooper simply “went too far” or “made inferences which were a stretch”.
I was required to repeatedly correct these attempts at judicial steering, and referred Justice Hammond to the incontrovertible evidence that Cooper J took “Hitler” and “Gestapo” from an article I published which had nothing to do with Jews and combined these words with an innocuous comment about Stiassny‟s influence in the Jewish community from an unrelated article.
Cooper J labelled his contrived quote evidence of “vile, racist abuse” by me. I asked Justice Hammond whether His Honour accepted the evidence proved – not my submissions – that Cooper J created racist invective where it did not naturally exist, and then unjustly attributed his contrived and unrepresented racist quote to me to support his finding of record damages. Justice Hammond refused to acknowledge this …
Yet when I responded [to the submissions made by the respondents‟ counsel] and attempted to put the blinkered submissions by respondents‟ counsel into proper context and refer the [B]ench to evidence which he evaded, Justices Arnold, Glazebrook and Hammond repeatedly and falsely claimed I was legally prevented from doing so. I quite appropriately stated that it was obviously an acceptable submission for the respondents to make, as the Court made [no] attempt to tell counsel such submissions were inappropriate or irrelevant.
Justices Arnold, Glazebrook and Hammond were still inappropriately vocally unreceptive and dismissive. (Emphasis in original) ________________________________________________________________
(9) This is a reference to the Supreme Court decision referred to above which specifically contemplated that the Court of Appeal would address Mr Siemer‟s complaint about the passage of the judgment of Cooper J referred to at [4] above, “to the extent that it may have influenced the level of the damages award”.
________________________________________________________________
[11] Mr Siemer complained that as well counsel for the respondents had misrepresented the position in submissions to the Court and that he had requested the Court of Appeal to refer the misrepresentation to the New Zealand Law Society of Disciplinary Conduct. This complaint in relation to the Judges is that: Justice Hammond refused to respond to this valid request.
[12] We were asked by Mr Siemer to obtain a transcript of the hearing in the Court of Appeal so that he could flesh out and particularise his complaints as to what the Judges, and particularly Hammond J, said during that hearing. A decision on this request was deferred pending receipt of the submissions on the leave application.
[13] The material which Mr Siemer has put to us (including the letter we have cited from above) is tendentious. The same is true of his arguments in the Court of Appeal. It is one thing to contend that there were errors in the analysis of Cooper J; it is another to accuse him of “fabricating evidence”. Further, as in this Court, most of the arguments Mr Siemer wished to advance were irrelevant to what was in issue. The tendentiousness and irrelevance of so much of what he had to say meant that testy exchanges between him and the Judges were practically inevitable. All in all, we see nothing in the material put to us by Mr Siemer to suggest anything approaching bias. For the sake of completeness we also reject Mr Siemer‟s contention that the Court of Appeal displayed bias by not referring the conduct of counsel for the respondent to the Law Society. If Mr Siemer is of the view that counsel was guilty of professional misconduct, there is no reason why he should not complain himself. And given that nothing approaching a credible suggestion of bias has been put forward, we see no reason to obtain a transcript from the Court of Appeal.
[14] For those reasons, the application for leave to appeal should be dismissed.
Solicitors: McElroys, Auckland for Respondents
________________________________________________________________
Doesn’t this help confirm why our New Zealand so desperately needs some checks and balances to help ensure an ‘open, transparent and accountable’ judiciary?
URGENT SYSTEMS CHANGES REQUIRED!
1) An enforceable ‘Code of Conduct’ for Judges.
(Preferably based upon the ‘Banagalore Principles for Judicial Conduct’
Reprinted in full at the end of this post) )
www.unodc.org/unodc/search.html?q=Bangalore+Principles+of+judicial+Conduct
2) An enforceable ‘Register of Pecuniary Interests’ for Judges.
3) ALL Court proceedings to be recorded, and records made available to parties who request them.
Please pass this on to as many people as possible!
Penny Bright
waterpressure@gmail.com
________________________________________________________________
THE BANGALORE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 2002
(The Bangalore Draft Code of Judicial Conduct 2001adopted by the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity,as revised at the Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices
held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, November 25-26, 2002)
Preamble
WHEREAS the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes as fundamental the
principle that everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of rights and obligations and of any criminal charge.
WHEREAS the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees that all persons shall be equal before the courts, and that in the determination of any criminal charge or of rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled, without undue delay, to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
WHEREAS the foregoing fundamental principles and rights are also recognized or reflected inregional human rights instruments, in domestic constitutional, statutory and common law, and in judicial conventions and traditions.
WHEREAS the importance of a competent, independent and impartial judiciary to the
protection of human rights is given emphasis by the fact that the implementation of all the other rights ultimately depends upon the proper administration of justice.
WHEREAS a competent, independent and impartial judiciary is likewise essential if the courts are to fulfil their role in upholding constitutionalism and the rule of law.
WHEREAS public confidence in the judicial system and in the moral authority and integrity of the judiciary is of the utmost importance in a modern democratic society.
WHEREAS it is essential that judges, individually and collectively, respect and honour judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in the judicial system.
WHEREAS the primary responsibility for the promotion and maintenance of high standards of judicial conduct lies with the judiciary in each country.
AND WHEREAS the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary are designed to secure and promote the independence of the judiciary, and are addressed primarily to States.
THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES are intended to establish standards for ethical conduct of judges. They are designed to provide guidance to judges and to afford the judiciary a framework for regulating judicial conduct.
They are also intended to assist members of the executive and the legislature, and lawyers and the public in general, to better understand and support the judiciary. These principles presuppose that judges are accountable for their conduct to appropriate institutions established to maintain judicial standards, which are themselves independent and impartial, and are intended to supplement and not to derogate from existing rules of law and conduct which bind the judge.
Value 1:
INDEPENDENCE
Principle:
Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional aspects.
Application:
1.1 A judge shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of the judge’s assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
1.2 A judge shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the particular parties to a dispute which the judge has to adjudicate.
1.3 A judge shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to a reasonable observer to be free therefrom.
1.4 In performing judicial duties, a judge shall be independent of judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.
1.5 A judge shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain and enhance the institutional and operational independence of the judiciary.
1.6 A judge shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.
Value 2:
IMPARTIALITY
Principle:
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.
Application:
2.1 A judge shall perform his or her judicial duties without favour, bias or prejudice.
2.2 A judge shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
2.3 A judge shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct himself or herself as to minimise the occasions on which it will be necessary for the judge to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.
2.4 A judge shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come before, the judge, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall the judge make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
2.5 A judge shall disqualify himself or herself from participating in any proceedings in which the judge is unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that the judge is unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where
2.5.1 the judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceedings;
2.5.2 the judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in controversy; or
2.5.3 the judge, or a member of the judge’s family, has an economic interest in the outcome of the matter in controversy:
Provided that disqualification of a judge shall not be required if no other tribunal can be constituted to deal with the case or, because of urgent circumstances, failure to act could lead to a serious miscarriage of justice.
Value 3:
INTEGRITY
Principle:
Integrity is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office.
Application:
3.1 A judge shall ensure that his or her conduct is above reproach in the view of a reasonable observer.
3.2 The behaviour and conduct of a judge must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
Value 4:
PROPRIETY
Principle:
Propriety, and the appearance of propriety, are essential to the performance of all of the activities of a judge.
Application:
4.1 A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge’s activities.
4.2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, a judge shall conduct himself or herself in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
4.3. A judge shall, in his or her personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who practise regularly in the judge’s court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favouritism or partiality.
4.4 A judge shall not participate in the determination of a case in which any member of the judge’s family represents a litigant or is associated in any manner with the case.
4.5 A judge shall not allow the use of the judge’s residence by a member of the legal profession to receive clients or other members of the legal profession.
4.6 A judge, like any other citizen, is entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, a judge shall always conduct himself or herself in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
4.7 A judge shall inform himself or herself about the judge’s personal and fiduciary financial interests and shall make reasonable efforts to be informed about the financial interests of members of the judge’s family.
4.8 A judge shall not allow the judge’s family, social or other relationships improperly to influence the judge’s judicial conduct and judgment as a judge.
4.9 A judge shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge, a member of the judge’s family or of anyone else, nor shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties.
4.10 Confidential information acquired by a judge in the judge’s judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed by the judge for any other purpose not related to the judge’s judicial duties.
4.11 Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, a judge may:
4.11.1 write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning the law, the legal system, the administration of justice or related matters;
4.11.2 appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned with matters relating to the law, the legal system, the administration of justice or related matters;
4.11.3 serve as a member of an official body, or other government commission, committee or advisory body, if such membership is not inconsistent with the perceived impartiality and political neutrality of a judge; or
4.11.4 engage in other activities if such activities do not detract from the dignity of the judicial office or otherwise interfere with the performance of judicial duties.
4.12 A judge shall not practise law whilst the holder of judicial office.
4.13 A judge may form or join associations of judges or participate in other organisations representing the interests of judges.
4.14 A judge and members of the judge’s family, shall neither ask for, nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favour in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by the judge in connection with the performance of judicial duties.
4.15 A judge shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to the judge’s influence, direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favour in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection with his or her duties or functions.
4.16 Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, a judge may receive a token gift, award or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made provided that such gift, award or benefit might not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of partiality.
Value 5:
EQUALITY
Principle:
Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance of the judicial office.
Application:
5.1 A judge shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in society and differences arising from various sources, including but not limited to race, colour, sex, religion, national origin, caste, disability, age, marital status, sexual orientation, social and economic status and other like causes (“irrelevant grounds”).
5.2 A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.
5.3 A judge shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.
5.4 A judge shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to the judge’s influence, direction or control to differentiate between persons concerned, in a matter before the judge, on any irrelevant ground.
5.5 A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from
manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on irrelevant grounds, except such as are legally relevant to an issue in proceedings and may be the subject of legitimate advocacy.
Value 6:
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
Principle:
Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.
Application:
6.1 The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all other activities.
6.2 A judge shall devote the judge’s professional activity to judicial duties, which include not only the performance of judicial functions and responsibilities in court and the making of decisions, but also other tasks relevant to the judicial office or the court’s operations.
6.3 A judge shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance the judge’s knowledge, skills and personal qualities necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for this purpose of the training and other facilities which should be made available, under judicial control, to judges.
6.4 A judge shall keep himself or herself informed about relevant developments of international law, including international conventions and other instruments establishing human rights norms.
6.5 A judge shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
6.6 A judge shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. The judge shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to the judge’s influence, direction or control.
6.7 A judge shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent discharge of judicial duties.
IMPLEMENTATION
By reason of the nature of judicial office, effective measures shall be adopted by national judiciaries to provide mechanisms to implement these principles if such mechanisms are not already in existence in their jurisdictions.
DEFINITIONS
In this statement of principles, unless the context otherwise permits or requires, the following meanings shall be attributed to the words used:
“Court staff” includes the personal staff of the judge including law clerks.
“Judge” means any person exercising judicial power, however designated.
“Judge’s family” includes a judge’s spouse, son, daughter, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, and any other close relative or person who is a companion or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge’s household.
“Judge’s spouse” includes a domestic partner of the judge or any other person of either sex in a close personal relationship with the judge
Explanatory Note
1. At its first meeting held in Vienna in April 2000 on the invitation of the United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention, and in conjunction with the 10th United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity (comprising Chief Justice Latifur Rahman of Bangladesh, Chief Justice Bhaskar Rao of Karnataka State in India, Justice Govind Bahadur Shrestha of Nepal, Chief Justice Uwais of Nigeria, Deputy Vice-President Langa of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, Chief Justice Nyalali of Tanzania, and Justice Odoki of Uganda, meeting under the chairmanship of Judge Christopher Weeramantry, Vice-President of the International Court of Justice, with Justice Michael Kirby of the High Court of Australia as rapporteur, and with the participation of Dato’ Param Cumaraswamy, UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers) recognized the need for a code against which the conduct of judicial officers may be measured. Accordingly, the Judicial Group requested that codes of judicial conduct which had been adopted in some jurisdictions be analyzed, and a report be prepared by the Co-ordinator of the Judicial Integrity Programme, Dr Nihal Jayawickrama, concerning:
(a) the core considerations which recur in such codes; and (b) the optional or additional considerations which occur in some, but not all, such codes and which may or may not be suitable for adoption in particular countries.
2. In preparing a draft code of judicial conduct in accordance with the directions set out above, reference was made to several existing codes and international instruments including, in particular, the following:
(a) The Code of Judicial Conduct adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, August 1972.
(b) Declaration of Principles of Judicial Independence issued by the Chief Justices of the Australian States and Territories, April 1997.
(c) Code of Conduct for the Judges of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, prescribed by the Supreme Judicial Council in the exercise of power under Article 96(4)(a) of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, May 2000.
(d) Ethical Principles for Judges, drafted with the cooperation of the Canadian Judges Conference and endorsed by the Canadian Judicial Council, 1998.
(e) The European Charter on the Statute for Judges, Council of Europe, July 1998.
(f) The Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct 1976.
(g) Restatement of Values of Judicial Life adopted by the Chief Justices Conference of India, 1999.
(h) The Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct.
(i) Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers of Kenya, July 1999.
(j) The Judges’ Code of Ethics of Malaysia, prescribed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong on the recommendation of the Chief Justice, the President of the Court of Appeal and the Chief Judges of the High Courts, in the exercise of powers conferred by Article 125(3A) of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, 1994.
(k) The Code of Conduct for Magistrates in Namibia.
(l) Rules Governing Judicial Conduct, New York State, USA.
(m) Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
(n) Code of Conduct to be observed by Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts of Pakistan.
(o) The Code of Judicial Conduct of the Philippines, September 1989
(p) The Canons of Judicial Ethics of the Philippines, proposed by the Philippines Bar Association, approved by the Judges of First Instance of Manila, and adopted for the guidance of and observance by the judges under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court, including municipal judges and city judges.
(q) Yandina Statement: Principles of Independence of the Judiciary in Solomon Islands, November 2000.
(r) Guidelines for Judges of South Africa, issued by the Chief Justice, the President of the Constitutional Court, and the Presidents of High Courts, the Labour Appeal Court, and the Land Claims Court, March 2000.
(s) Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers of Tanzania, adopted by the Judges andMagistrates Conference, 1984.
(t) The Texas Code of Judicial Conduct
(u) Code of Conduct for Judges, Magistrates and Other Judicial Officers of Uganda, adopted by the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court, July 1989.
(v) The Code of Conduct of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
The Canons of Judicial Conduct for the Commonwealth of Virginia, adopted and promulgated by the Supreme Court of Virginia, 1998.
(x) The Code of Judicial Conduct adopted by the Supreme Court of the State ofWashington, USA, October 1995.
(y) The Judicial (Code of Conduct) Act, enacted by the Parliament of Zambia, December 1999.
(z) Draft Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (“Siracusa Principles”), prepared by a committee of experts convened by the International Association of Penal Law, the International Commission of Jurists, and the Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, 1981.
(aa) Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence adopted by the International Bar Association, 1982.
(bb) United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, endorsed by the UN General Assembly, 1985.
(cc) Draft Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice (“Singhvi Declaration”) prepared by Mr L.V. Singhvi, UN Special Rapporteur on the Study on the Independence of the Judiciary, 1989.
(dd) The Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the Lawasia Region, adopted by the 6th Conference of Chief Justices, August 1997.
(ee) The Latimer House Guidelines for the Commonwealth on good practice governing relations between the Executive, Parliament and the Judiciary in the promotion of good governance, the rule of law and human rights to ensure the effective implementation of the Harare Principles, 1998.
(ff) The Policy Framework for Preventing and Eliminating Corruption and Ensuring the Impartiality of the Judicial System, adopted by the expert group convened by the Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, February 2000.
At its second meeting held in Bangalore in February 2001, the Judicial Group (comprising Chief Justice Mainur Reza Chowdhury of Bangladesh, Justice Claire L’Heureux Dube of Canada, Chief Justice Reddi of Karnataka State in India, Chief Justice Upadhyay of Nepal, Chief Justice Uwais of Nigeria, Deputy Chief Justice Langa of South Africa, Chief Justice Silva of Sri Lanka, Chief Justice Samatta of Tanzania, and Chief Justice Odoki of Uganda, meeting under the chairmanship of Judge Weeramantry, with Justice Kirby as rapporteur, and with the participation of the UN Special Rapporteur and Justice Bhagwati, Chairman of the UN Human Rights Committee, representing the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights) proceeding by way of examination of the draft placed before it, identified the core values, formulated the relevant principles, and agreed on the Bangalore Draft Code of Judicial Conduct. The Judicial Group recognized, however, that since the Bangalore Draft had been developed by judges drawn principally from common law countries, it was essential that it be scrutinized by judges of other legal traditions to enable it to assume the status of a duly authenticated international code of judicial conduct.
The Bangalore Draft was widely disseminated among judges of both common law and civil law systems and discussed at several judicial conferences. In June 2002, it was reviewed by the Working Party of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE-GT), comprising Vice- President Reissner of the Austrian Association of Judges, Judge Fremr of the High Court in the Czech Republic, President Lacabarats of the Cour d’Appel de Paris in France, Judge Mallmann of the Federal Administrative Court of Germany, Magistrate Sabato of Italy, Judge Virgilijus of the Lithuanian Court of Appeal, Premier Conseiller Wiwinius of the Cour d’Appel of Luxembourg, Juge Conseiller Afonso of the Court of Appeal of Portugal, Justice Ogrizek of the Supreme Court of Slovenia, President Hirschfeldt of the Svea Court of Appeal in Sweden, and Lord Justice Mance of the United Kingdom. On the initiative of the American Bar Association, the Bangalore Draft was translated into the national languages, and reviewed by judges, of the Central and Eastern European countries; in particular, of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Romania, Serbia and Slovakia.
The Bangalore Draft was revised in the light of the comments received from CCJE-GT and others referred to above; Opinion no.1 (2001) of CCJE on standards concerning the independence of the judiciary; the draft Opinion of CCJE on the principles and rules governing judges’ professional conduct, in particular ethics, incompatible behaviour and impartiality; and by reference to more recent codes of judicial conduct including the Guide to Judicial Conduct published by the Council of Chief Justices of Australia in June 2002, the Model Rules of Conduct for Judges of the Baltic States, the Code of Judicial Ethics for Judges of the People’s Republic of China, and the Code of Judicial Ethics of the Macedonian Judges Association.
The revised Bangalore Draft was placed before a Round-Table Meeting of Chief Justices (or their representatives) from the civil law system, held in the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands, in November 2002, with Judge Weeramantry presiding. Those participating were Judge Vladimir de Freitas of the Federal Court of Appeal of Brazil, Chief Justice Iva Brozova of the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic, Chief Justice Mohammad Fathy Naguib of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, Conseillere Christine Chanet of the Cour de Cassation of France, President Genaro David Gongora Pimentel of the Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nacion of Mexico, President Mario Mangaze of the Supreme Court of Mozambique, President Pim Haak of the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, Justice Trond Dolva of the Supreme Court of Norway, and Chief Justice Hilario Davide of the Supreme Court of the Philippines. Also participating in one session were the following Judges of the International Court of Justice: Judge Ranjeva (Madagascar), Judge Herczegh (Hungary), Judge Fleischhauer (Germany), Judge Koroma (Sierra Leone), Judge Higgins (United Kingdom), Judge Rezek (Brazil), Judge Elaraby (Egypt), and Ad-Hoc Judge Frank (USA). The UN Special Rapporteur was in attendance. The “Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct” was the product of this meeting.
JANE BURGERMEISTER REPORT: ‘New Zealand citizens face show-trials under “terrorism” laws, reports Kiwisfirst’
New Zealand citizens face show-trials under “terrorism” laws, reports Kiwisfirst
“After almost 4 years and over $10 million in taxpayer funds thrown at the prosecution, few Kiwis are aware of the evidence and court proceedings in the criminal prosecution of 18 New Zealand citizens initially labelled as terrorists, but whom the U.S. Embassy in Wellington was advised in 2007 by NZ Police would likely face only fines of up to $4,000.
The High Court has tried to shroud the proceedings in secrecy.
But you can FIND OUT THE INSIDE STORY AND FACTS at
JANE BURGERMEISTER REPORT: ‘German tax payers face 65-billion-euro bill for the Greece bankster bailout, says FDP finance expert’
German tax payers face 65-billion-euro bill for the Greece bankster bailout, says FDP finance expert
German tax payers could face a bill of 65 billion euros by 2015 for the bankster bailout for Greece alone, according to Frank Schäffler, financial spokesman for the Free Democrats, the junior partner in Germany’s coalition government.
German tax payer’s are already the biggest private creditors of Greece after the ECB bought up Greek souvereign debt, reports the FTD. But the amount they are owed is set to soar as Greece’s national debt grows.
http://www.ftd.de/finanzen/:euro-krise-die-groessten-griechenland-glaeubiger/60066259.html
The German government buried a policy document by economic experts in autumn 2010 urging an insolvency mechanism to be introduced to help country’s that are burdened with an unsustainable debt, as reported on this blog.
An insolvency mechanism is what is required for Greece – and yet there are still no plans for one.
Instead of following the recommendation of economic experts and putting Greece through a managed insolvency, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble are spreading hysteria, warning about a disorderly default and a worldwide financial crash to frighten lawmakers into putting limitless money into the giant debt hole of Greece as well as Ireland and Portugal.
The choice being offered to the people of the eurozone should include the option of a managed insolvency of Greece as well as Ireland and Portugal.
Merkel and Schäuble are falsely misrepresenting the choice as being between a disorderly default and a bank crash or limitless bankster bailouts.
Schäffler estimates that Greece’s existing debt of 350 billion euros is set to grow ever year by another 30 billion euros as the economy continues to contract under fiscal austerity measures prescribed by the EU, IMF and ECB. Greece’s national debt I, therefore, set to increase to 470 billion euros by 2015.
By that time, the commercial banks would have been able to offload the last of their Greek bonds onto the ECB, leaving the tax payers having to shoulder all the losses when Greece eventually defaults or reprofiles while the private banks have taken all the profits.
Because Germany has a 28% share in the ECB, tax payers would have to contribute 130 billion euros of the 470 billion euros, Schäffler calculates.
Assuming ( optimistically) a haircut of 50% on Greek bonds in 2015, the loss for German tax payers in 2015 would amount to 65 billion euros.
Germany has an annual tax revenue of about 250 billion euros right now in a boom time for its economy – one which has benefitted corporate shareholders and not low paid workers, however.
Added to the amount Germans will be expected to pay for Greece, will come billions more for Ireland, Portugal and possibly Spain and Italy by 2015.
A debt reduction for Greece if it were carried out today would cost German tax payer’s only 15 billion euros, Schäffler says.
However, there is no sign that the German government is going to stop the gigantic sums of money flowing from tax payers to American, German and French banks as part of the bankster bailouts.
The German government has not only ignored the advice of experts to create an insolvency mechanism to keep the bankster bailout’s flowing.It has also violated the no bail out clause of the Lisbon Treaty, it has also allowed the Bundesbanbk and the ECB to violate Article 123 of the ECB rulebook prohibiting the ECB from buying debt instruments of governments.
The ECB is estimated to have 75 billion euros of Greek souvereign debt on its books. In addition, the ECB has hundreds of billions of loans to Gree, Irish, Portuguese and Spanish banks against shaky collateral under an emergency liquidity programme.
The ECB has, in fact, so many bad loans that economist Hans Werner Sinn estimates that it will be in debt to itself in just two years if it continues at this pace.
How can the eurozone central bank money-making machine destroy so much capital so fast that it will actually be in debt to itself in just two years?
As Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff explains how Greece’s economy is being run into the ground.
“Today’s strategy, however, is far more likely to lead to blowup and disorderly restructuring. Why should the Greek people (not to mention the Irish and the Portuguese) accept years of austerity and slow growth for the sake of propping up the French and German banking systems, unless they are given huge bribes to do so? As Stanford professor Jeremy Bulow and I showed in our work on sovereign debt in the 1980’s, countries rarely can be squeezed into making net payments (payments minus new loans) to foreigners of more than a few percent for a few years. The current EU/International Monetary Fund strategy calls for a decade or two of such payments. It has to, lest the German taxpayer revolt at being asked to pay for Europe in perpetuity,” he writes.
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/rogoff81/English
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The Watchdog 
But even if Papandreou survives a vote of confidence expected on Wednesday and gets the legislation through parliament at the end of June, it does not look as if his government will survive for very long as mass protests continue to mount against plans for more cuts and more debt for the profit of American, German and French banks.
Trade unions took to the streets of Athens today to oppose plans to sell state assets, joining the “Indignant Citizen” movement to keep the pressure up on the government to abandon the failed IMF, EU and ECB austerity policies, which are only putting Greece deeper into debt.
“Thousands of Greeks marched on parliament on Saturday in a show of unabated public anger after Prime Minister George Papandreou reshuffled his cabinet and vowed to push on with a belt-tightening campaign,” reports Reuters.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/18/us-greece-idUSTRE75E0ZS20110618
Papandreou moved Bilderberg Finance Minister George Papaconstantino to the energy ministry. The privatisation of energy companies is part of a package of €80 billion or so of pension and public sector job cuts, tax increases and asset sales.
Though Greece’s public sector and energy companies undoubtedly need to undergo some reform and become more efficient, Greek lawmakers just have to look at the privatisation of British energy and transport companies to see an example of failed privatisations, which allowed corporations carte blanche to milk captive customers and double and tripple bills while slashing investment, and reducing services to a minimum.
If this is how Greek energy companies and other state assets are to be privatised, it is sure to add fuel to the social protests.
Alan Mattich in the WSJ argues the case for Greece defaulting and devaluing its — new Drachma? — currency to reignite growth.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304186404576389632761803982.html?mod=WSJ_hp_us_mostpop_read